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 ESSAY REVIEW III
 Service Intellectuals and the Politics of "Science"
 Charles Sumner Slichter: The Golden Vector, by Mark H. Ingra-
 ham. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.
 3164 + xiii pp. (cloth)
 Charles Kenneth Leith: Scientific Advisor, by Sylvia Wallace Mc-
 Grath. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press,
 1971. 255 + xii pp. (cloth)
 Harry L. Russell and Agricultural Science in Wisconsin, by Edward
 H. Beardsley. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin
 Press, 1969. 237 + x pp. (cloth)
 The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays, by Edward
 Shils. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972. 481 + xiii
 pp. (cloth)
 The term "intellectual" -denoting a specific type of person-is distinc-
 tively modern. It developed in Europe during the middle nineteenth cen-
 tury, and arrived in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth. The
 term represented one of the linguistic and conceptual responses that individ-
 uals made to the changing social conditions of modern society. Unlike
 such related terms as "academic," "scientist," "technician," "scholar," how-
 ever, the concept of the "intellectual" became the subject of debate and
 controversy. It did so, not only because the term served a variety of pur-
 poses, but more importantly because it was essentially a moral concept. An
 "intellectual" was one who was supposed to both discern the truth person-
 nally and uphold it publicly. An "intellectual," therefore, was an individual
 who acted under a special obligation and responsibility. The question of the
 "proper" role of the intellectual became a characteristically twentieth cen-
 tury concern. (1)
 While writers have offered various prescriptions for that role, perhaps the
 most common view in America has been that the intellectual should com-
 bine the best of two worlds. He should be critically objective yet socially in-
 volved, detached but practical, speculative but useful, moral but coopera-
 tive. To many the ideal intellectual became the "service intellectual." The
 attractiveness of such an image, or self-image, is obvious. Its potentially
 self-contradictory nature is equally obvious.
 The University of Wisconsin Press has recently published biographies of
 three scientists whose careers unfolded on the Madison campus. Together
 they help illuminate the history of American higher education, the history of
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 applied science, and the history of the "service intellectual." In spite of dif-
 ferences the three volumes point to some similar conclusions. All three of
 the scientists, for example, enjoyed a high degree of upward social mobility,
 yet their origins were in a relatively educated and economically stable middle
 class. Hence they reinforce the contention that the upward mobility that the
 universities fostered at the end of the nineteenth century was a mobility that
 extended only occasionally below the middle class. The books illustrate,
 too, the extent to which the academics shared the economic values of the
 rest of their society. All three men earnestly sought financial success, em-
 ployed their science for profitable ends, and ended their careers as rather
 wealthy individuals. (2) They believed that science should be "applied" and
 that its results would be benevolent. Their lives justified both beliefs. All
 three were socially conservative, institutionally adaptive, and technically ori-
 ented. Though their professional careers were more successful than most,
 they probably represented the social attitudes of many American academics.
 They reveal the diversity to be found among "intellectuals" and serve to
 remind us that the "liberal reformer" was only one type among many.
 Mark Ingraham's biography of Charles Sumner Slichter is the least valu-
 able of the three. The author, a mathematician and younger colleague of
 Slichter's for over twenty-five years, accepted the biographer's burden as a
 labor of affection for his friend. He rejects the historian's "paraphernalia
 of producing footnotes," and tries instead to merely record the life of a "col-
 orful personality." (3) Unfortunately, he also rejects such things as re-
 search and analysis. "I have made no attempt to marshall all the evidence,
 some of it hearsay, for or against these conclusions," he explains at one
 point, "but have used some to tell the story of what happened." (4) While
 the reader can sympathize with both Professor Ingraham's attitude and his
 plight, the result must be disappointing to all but older and nostalgic Wis-
 consin alumni. The book, which relies on extensive and often undigested
 excerpts from Slichter's writings, is a kind of genial and reminescent third-
 person autobiography.
 Slichter was born in Minnesota in 1864, the descendant of Swiss Menno-
 nites who had immigrated to the United States in the late eighteenth century.
 Graduating from Northwestern University with a Bachelor's degree in 1885,
 he received an appointment in mathematics at Wisconsin the following
 year. Slichter worked in engineering and applied mathematics, enjoying the
 challenge of applying abstract formulae to the solution of practical difficul-
 ties. As a member of the United States Geological Survey, he began to spe-
 cialize in problems of underground water flow, gradually developing an ex-
 tensive consulting career dealing with irrigation and urban water supplies.
 Apparently a popular and slightly unorthodox teacher, he became a well
 known and influential campus figure. As Chairman from 1906 to 1920 he co-
 operated with Edward Van Vleck in building the department into a major
 center of American mathematics. From 1920 until his retirement in 1934 he
 served as Dean of the Graduate School. Slichter focused much of his effort
 on enlarging the University's support for scholarly research of all types, and
 he was a major figure in establishing the justly famed Wisconsin Alumni
 Research Fund.
 98 HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY
This content downloaded from 208.67.210.24 on Wed, 05 Dec 2018 15:09:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Given the nature of the book, it is difficult to evaluate Slichter's career.
 One assumes that all of those people, including the central figure, were not
 always that nice and that jovial. Still, Slichter does come alive in places as
 a likeable individual who was an effective administrator. His success was un-
 doubtedly based more on his personal character than on his intellectual
 achievements. The book catches a bit of the flavor of the late nineteenth
 century classroom, and it touches on such things as the growth of academic
 consulting and of administrative bureaucracy. What scholarly value it pos-
 sesses, however, lies only in the increment of raw materials it provides for
 the historian of the American university.
 Sylvia Wallace McGrath's biography of Charles Kenneth Leith is fortu-
 nately more reliable and more revealing. The author is careful and thor-
 ough; the book is well researched. Its most significant parts deal with those
 crucial areas where academic science overlaps with problems of government
 policy and economic development. It tends to become rather vague when
 treating Leith's early years and his personal life, but that may well be due to
 a scarcity of source materials. Discussions of his technical achievements are
 also rather vague, and it is occasionally not clear what their precise signifi-
 cance was. On the whole, however, the book is both useful and informative.
 Born in a small Wisconsin town in 1875, Leith entered the state univer-
 sity in 1892 and soon found himself fascinated with the geological researches
 of Charles R. Van Hise. Quickly becoming Van Hise's protege, Leith finished
 the Ph.D. under his direction and then joined the department. As Slichter
 had done, Leith began working with the U. S. Geological Survey, and he
 soon established himself as an expert on the Lake Superior mining regions,
 specializing in problems of rock cleavage and pre-Cambrian geology. He also
 developed, with Van Hise, an extensive and lucrative consulting practice,
 at one point touring the Lake Superior regions in the private railroad cars of
 United States Steel. During the First World War Leith served as a special
 consultant to the United States government on wartime mineral supplies.
 From that experience he developed an interest in national mineral policy
 and the economic and political problems that affected world trade. He ad-
 vocated a unified national policy that would provide a rational basis for
 American mineral usage, exploiting only the internal supplies that were
 plentiful and opening up world resources-especially in domestically scarce
 commodities-for American development. Enjoying little success in the twen-
 ties, Leith fared somewhat better under the New Deal. Still it was not until
 the Second World War that the need for a national mineral policy seemed
 compelling. Once again, in time of war, his efforts were important in helping
 to secure and allocate the vital raw materials necessary for American in-
 dustry. After the war Leith turned his attention to the mineral problems re-
 lated to atomic energy. In 1956, shortly before his death, the Atomic Energy
 Commission presented him with a special citation for his "significant con-
 tribution to his country's security and welfare." (5)
 Charles Kenneth Leith: Scientific Advisor provides a useful account of a
 significant career. Its major weakness lies in its failure to use materials to
 help illuminate broader themes. Leith was, for example, closely associated
 with the business community. He invested heavily in a number of ventures
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 and was often involved with Van Hise in land speculations arising out of
 his geological explorations. For many years Andrew Carnegie financed their
 enterprises. Van Hise keeping the partnership a secret since he "feared that
 his connection with Carnegie would be misinterpreted." (6) Leith con-
 sulted for a number of mining and industrial firms, and on many occasions
 he represented their interests before state and federal officials. He was con-
 vinced, too, that the scientific strength of the Wisconsin department depend-
 ed in large part on close connections with the corporations that could fi-
 nance geological explorations and provide positions for the department's
 graduates.
 Beyond the many potential conflicts-of-interest in which Leith was inevi-
 tably involved lay the broader questions of the extent and nature of the in-
 fluence that business corporations and the quest for personal wealth have
 exerted on the course of American science and education. In specific ways
 business demands have helped determine the development of both; in a more
 general way business values have helped create the very cultural basis out
 of which both have grown. While there may be aspects of "science" that are
 truly "objective," there are others that are determined by the cultural and
 social institutions within which "science" functions. Leith's career could have
 servled as an enlightening case study of those interrelationships.
 Unfortunately Professor McGrath devotes relatively little attention to
 Leith's political and social ideas, emphasizing instead his general belief that
 "the scientist had an obligation to use his science in the practical conduct of
 human affairs." (7) The implicit assumption seems to be that the practical
 use of science was essentially an obvious and non-partisan process-the ap-
 plication of "objective" methods to merely "technical" problems. Yet is is
 clear, especially in his role as a planner, that the policies Leith suggested
 were themselves determined as much by his political and cultural orienta-
 tion as by "science." The author notes that one of Leith's reports "looked
 at mineral problems from the broad self-interest of the United States," (8)
 but she ignores the fact that his proposals were much more political and
 partisan than that. Leith stood for an "open door" policy in relation to world
 mineral development, a policy that would allow American industry to ex-
 ploit the resources of other nations. Most revealingly, he conceived of the
 central conflict as one between "the world demand for minerals, which
 tended toward international unification, and the 'nationalistic forces direct-
 ed toward partitioning resources for national gain and security'." (9) The
 first attitude, he assumed, was based on scientific study and rational plan-
 ning; the second was based on willful ignorance and narrow selfishness.
 While the latter represented the demands of partisanship, the former rep-
 resented the demands of "the world." That America and her corporations
 might themselves be partisan, narrow, or selfish apparently did not deter him.
 Through a rhetorically objective but functionally partisan rationale of
 market demand and efficiency he in practice largely equated "the world de-
 mand" with the actual needs of American business. Here indeed was "objec-
 tivity" serving the demands of a specific ideological and economic viewpoint.
 While Leith's attempt to extend American power and influence was certainly
 unexceptional for one serving as a representative of the government, conceiv-
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 ing of that attempt as scientifically "objective", and therefore non-partisan, is
 both distorting and misleading. Leith evidently accepted it as such, and so,
 apparently, does Professor McGrath.
 Leith, of course, was not merely an apologist for American business.
 While he continually defended the interests of the mineral industries, he
 viewed himself as bringing a rational, scientific approach to national
 planning. After World War I he suggested that the accumulated data on
 mineral supplies could provide a "sound basis for planning a proper dis-
 tribution and use of raw materials of the earth." (10) In such a context
 'proper" was hardly a scientific word. It was, in fact, precisely because Leith
 could conceive of himself as a scientist, and therefore as "objective," that
 the implicit cultural and economic biases in his plans could go unnoticed
 and unanalyzed.
 Leith's career thus raises not just the issue of science as a guide for policy
 but more importantly the problem of how cultural values and individual
 preconceptions inform the very concept and meaning of science that in-
 dividuals hold. Leith was fairly and honestly a man of science and reason,
 yet those terms stand, not for neutral objectivity, but for varying types of
 evaluative intellectual frameworks. In order to understand Leith's function
 as a scientific advisor, then, it is first necessary to understand the set of per-
 ceptual and evaluative assumptions that informed his view of what exactly
 "science" was and how it operated. Those preconceptions were intimately
 related to the values of American business, and hence those policies that
 served the needs of business appeared to him as objectively rational and
 scientifically efficient.
 The book's conceptual framework, captured in the subtitle "scientific
 advisor," proves too cumbersome to adequately evaluate Leith's role. "His
 career," Professor McGrath declares, "heralded the rise of such advisors to
 positions of power and influence in American society." (11) As an indi-
 cation of a general change in American life, of the employment of experts
 in government positions, it is surely a fair statement. Beyond chronicling that
 development, however, the more important question would seem to be the
 nature of their employment and the extent of their "power and influence."
 Professor McGrath's biography adds to our knowledge of the "scientific ad-
 visor" and suggests the varied experience that such individuals have under-
 gone. Historians in the future, however, need to examine that variety more
 closely: to question the assumptions and purposes of such advisors, to analyze
 the meaning and function of "science" in their careers, and to weigh the exact
 nature of their activities and influence.
 Many of the broader educational and intellectual problems that Leith's
 career raises also reverberate through the life of Harry L. Russell, a con-
 temporary of both Slichter's and Leith's and for many years the Dean of the
 University of Wisconsin College of Agriculture. Growing up in the small
 Wisconsin town where he had been born in 1866, Russell was early intro-
 duced to the biological sciences by his father, a physician, and by his
 mother who had a well developed knowledge of botany. He pursued his sci-
 entific interests as both an undergraduate and a graduate at Madison, and
 then spent the year 1890-91 studying in Berlin, Naples, and Paris. Returning
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 to the United States he took a Ph.D. in biology from Johns Hopkins, special-
 izing in the embryonic field of plant bacteriology. After a year teaching at
 the University of Chicago, Russell returned to Wisconsin in 1893 as an assis-
 tant professor in the College of Agriculture. Focusing his attention on prob-
 lems relating to the dairy industry, he used scientific research to improve the
 quality of agricultural products and to protect the health of the consuming
 public. His stature within and without the university grew, and in 1907 he
 was appointed Dean of the College. Gradually his interests shifted from re-
 search itself to the institutional problems of the College and to broader is-
 sues of state and national agricultural policy. Russell continually stressed
 the need to expand agricultural production, often ignoring the economic
 and social plight of the farmer; by 1912 he was becoming a favorite target
 of Wisconsin Progressives. Educationally Russell was an empire builder, con-
 stantly pushing to expand the College through growth, diversification, and
 exclusive control over state agricultural extension programs. He turned the
 College into a major research institute, arguing for more and more basic re-
 search, and in the twenties joined with Slichter and a few others in founding
 the Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund. Resigning his deanship in 1931, he
 served until his retirement in 1937 as WARF's director.
 Edward H. Beardsley's biography of Russell is enjoyable, well written,
 and thoughtful. It charts the rise of a sophisticated agricultural science dur-
 ing the first decades of the twentieth century, pointing out its achievements
 as well as its limitations. Beardsley delineates the social and political con-
 text which surrounded and influenced Russell's efforts, and he emphasizes
 the scientist's shrewd ability to work within those given confines. Russell's
 determined campaign to combat bovine tuberculosis, for example, includ-
 ed public debate, open demonstrations, and legislative lobbying in addition
 to scientific research. Beardsley's study has the additional advantage of pro-
 viding a kind of middle level view of the transformation of the American
 university. While much of the historical literature provides either an over-
 view through the lives of the great presidents or a disciplinary view through
 the work of major researchers, Beardsley offers the perspective of an admin-
 istrator, powerful but .not dominant, who was faced with the day to day
 problems of institutional change, who was both scientist and bureaucrat.
 It is an admirable work of historical scholarship.
 While the author, like so many biographers, shows a certain fondness
 for his subject, he nevertheless retains a critical perspective. Though he ex-
 onerates Russell of many of the charges that progressives such as Charles
 McCarthy levelled at him, Beardsley nevertheless traces Russell's growing
 aloofness from the state's farmers and his steady commitment to farm pro-
 ductivity instead of farm income. Russell was both an economic and social
 conservative, and after 1917 the Wisconsin progressives in his mind easily
 became "Bolsheviki." (12) During the war he served under Herbert
 Hoover in the Food Administration, and his conservatism together with his
 "lack of emotional identification with farmers" easily translated into a ma-
 nipulative, bureaucratic approach to problems of wartime production. (13)
 He responded to the protests of his former constituents with organized and
 stern appeals to patriotism.
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 Throughout much of his deanship critics accused Russell of fitting the
 policies of the College of Agriculture to the demands of bankers, real estate
 speculators, and other non-farm groups. Beardsley generally defends Rus-
 sell, acknowledging only one clear and specific case where a major policy
 innovation significantly and favorably affected his personal real estate in-
 vestments. In looking for such obvious conflicts-of-interest, however, the
 author sometimes downplays the more general conflict-of-interest engen-
 dered by Russell's basic social attitudes. To the extent, at least, that the dean
 of a College of Agriculture is supposed to heed the interests of the state's
 farmers, Russell frequently failed in his duties. He was inattentive and even
 callous. Agricultural problems for him were to be solved within a frame-
 work congenial to the bankers and land developers with whom he was so
 closely associated.
 Russell's scientific outlook, together with his social assumptions, led him
 to conceive of the problems of American agriculture as "technical" problems.
 He focused, therefore, on such manageable and restricted areas as increasing
 productivity and improving quality. He ignored difficulties that could not
 be so readily resolved or so easily defined in strictly physical terms. Russell's
 concept of agricultural science, therefore, stemmed in part from implicit
 social assumptions, and its practice had, in turn, indirect but significant
 political implications. "Science" indicated to him that certain problems
 were soluble and that others were not.
 Russell's career suggests the same problem that Leith's raised: the extent
 to which "science" in fact grows from and serves partisan and ideological
 purposes. Beardsley's study delineates one of the ways that the process can
 work, and it suggests the ideological bias of Russell's professional work.
 Still, however, it shares, though to a lesser extent, the same interpretative
 assumption that marks the books of Ingraham and McGrath. That assump-
 tion is that the history of the modern university and of the "service intellec-
 tual"- and to some extent the history of twentieth century America-is the
 history of the rise of scientific progress, rationality, objectivity, and benevo-
 lence. The problem is not that such an interpretative theme is wrong, but
 rather that it is biased and partial. It can lead historians to overlook the
 problems that science creates or the ones it cannot solve. It often ignores the
 extent to which science serves some social groups at the expense of others;
 the extent to which science is channelled by the demands of social institu-
 tions; the extent to which science is itself only a partial way of looking at the
 world; the extent to which science itself is based on cultural preconcep-
 tions. (14) In short, such an interpretative framework leads one to believe
 that "science" is a clear, unified, and objective phenomenon, obscuring the
 variety of "non-objective" personal, class, religious, or cultural evalua-
 tions which in fact help determine the specific meaning and utility that
 "science" has for different individuals. The twentieth century surely repre-
 sents the rise of science in the sense that scientific activities have prolifer-
 ated and had a great impact on societies. But no longer can we accept the
 eighteenth century assumption that the rise of "science" is equally the rise
 of a humanitarian progress and an objective truth. We must begin to look
 more penetratingly at what its actual consequences have been in a variety
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 of situations and for a variety of groups. We must also begin to inquire
 more deeply what "science" itself really is.
 Perhaps more than any contemporary American scholar Edward Shils has
 studied the significance and role of such institutionalized, scientific intellec-
 tuals as Slichter, Leith, and Russell. He has asked pertinent questions
 about the social implications of science and about the social assumptions of
 a wide range of intellectual types, from radical ideologues to bureaucratic
 functionaries. He has also reached some forceful conclusions. The Intellec-
 tuals and the Powers and Other Essays brings together many of his previ-
 ously published papers on the functions, attitudes, and responsibilities of
 the educated classes. The volume contains a series of stimulating theoreti-
 cal outlines and often perceptive case studies. The title essay itself, though
 over fifteen years old, still remains one of the most useful summaries of the
 subject available.
 Shils stands forth proudly as a spokesman for that generation of American
 social scientists which grew to intellectual maturity in the late thirties
 and rose to prominence during the forties and fifties. "In the 1930s," he
 writes in his introduction, "I witnessed with revulsion the rush of the Gada-
 rene intellectuals in the United States and Europe into the arms and snares
 of their respective communist parties." That experience revealed "the
 capacity of intellectuals in politics for folly and malevolence." (15) The
 post-war prosperity that the United States enjoyed, coinciding with per-
 sonal success, taught most of the members of that generation the basic good-
 ness of America's institutions and the fundamental necessity for their preser-
 vation. McCarthyism further taught them that danger lay with uneducated
 and disaffected masses, and with intellectuals and politicians who might sup-
 port their "populistic" attempts to subvert stable social institutions. The
 major political question, then, became whether members of the scientific
 and scholarly communities would "have sufficient strength of character and
 devotion to their intellectual traditions to withstand an uncritical populism
 on the one side and the winds of frivolous doctrine which blow up from
 time to time among intellectuals on the other." (16) "Populism" and "ideol-
 ogy" thus evoked the image of two acient myths, Scylla and Charybdis.
 Shils' essays mount a concerted attack on those two shibboleths. They
 argue that intellectuals should be scientifically objective and appreciative of
 the status quo, two attitudes which become synonymous. "The stability of
 the larger society," he declares, "depends, therefore, on the maintenance,
 within the culture and the institutional system of the intellectuals, of the
 predominance of that element which accepts an objective discipline and
 the integration of academic institutions into the central institutional sys-
 tem of American society." One of his avowed aims is to "reveal the fact that
 by no means all intellectuals have been in opposition to their societies." (17)
 The careers of Slichter, Leith, and Russell surely support such a contention.
 At a time when many thoughtful Americans are growing more deeply
 concerned with what they see as the danger of the institutional incorporation
 of intellectuals, the business oriented and bureaucratic domination of social
 values, and institutional stability that borders on fatal rigidity, Shils sees the
 same phenomena but insists on their desirability. The problem with his book
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 does not lie in the fact that it is a dissent from the latest intellectual fad. The
 difficulty is that it represents a partisan political ethic masquerading as "ob-
 jective" science.
 Shils' conceptual framework rests ultimately on a series of moral judg-
 ments and definitions, some explicit, some implicit. First, he judges the exist-
 ing institutions of American society to be good. "The more valid aspirations
 of the older humanitarian elements which were absorbed into Marx-
 ism," he maintains, "have been more or less fulfilled in capitalist countries."
 Though presented in the form of a statement of historical fact, that sentence
 functions, in actuality, as a fundamental moral axiom. It is unproven and
 largely unanalyzed. In spite of the scientific rhetoric it is essentially an a
 priori definition of an ethical standard. Those aspirations and ideals are
 largely "valid," Shils postulates, which have already been "more or less ful-
 filled." Those which have not been "more or less fulfilled" are, it logically
 follows, basically invalid. Thus Shils creates a moral system in which the
 status quo functions normatively to define which social ideals are morally
 acceptable and which are impractical, dangerous or evil. "It seems almost as
 if what was sound in the older ideologies has been realized," Shils argues,
 "and what was unsound has demonstrated its unsoundness so obviously
 that enthusiasm sustained by reason can no longer be summoned." (18)
 The status quo thus serves not only as a moral criterion, but it equally es-
 tablishes the bounds for determining what is even "rational."
 Viewing the capitalist countries as manifestations of the good society,
 Shils replaces the idea of social "conflict" with that of "tensions," which are
 consistently described in terms of "center" and "periphery." Through such a
 metaphor, Shils conceives of the society as a smoothly functioning unity
 characterized by the ready flow of individuals and programs toward a "cen-
 ter" which regulates the political concensus. There is no place for irrecon-
 cilable social divisions and no suggestion of organized oppression. The
 metaphor suggests, of course, the opposite: society is tranquil and there
 is a ready opportunity for "the narrowing of the distance between center
 and periphery." (19)
 Second, Shils conceives of the "intellectual" in vague and diffuse terms.
 The word takes on different meanings in different contexts, and on occa-
 sion it seems that anyone who does anything that requires some kind of
 special training is an "intellectual." Essentially he assumes a contentless,
 functional definition: "Those who perform intellectual roles constitute the
 intellectual classes." (20) The term "intellectual" has, of course, always
 been imprecise, and Shils is privileged to define it any way he chooses. It is
 fair, however, to consider the implications of his usage.
 The broad and contentless definition enables him to include innumerable
 social groups in the "intellectual class" (bureaucrats, civil servants, techni-
 cians, planners, etc.) and thereby to prove easily that "intellectuals" are var-
 ied, practical, important, and crucial to the operations of modern society.
 Of course, he has "proven" very little; rather he has merely elaborated his
 initial definition. His conclusions are essentially tautologies. It is all based
 on a circular argument. His assumption of the goodness and rationality of
 the status quo leads him to believe that large numbers who serve it are truly
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 "intellectuals," while the fact that so many "intellectuals" serve established
 institutions in turn confirms that the status quo is good and rational.
 By defining "intellectuals" as largely "at the center" of American society,
 Shils is able to deduce the logical corollary: there is little or no reason for a
 sense of alienation, helplessness, or disaffection on the part of intellectuals.
 Occasional sharp criticism, therefore, must arise not from a perception of
 substantive weaknesses in the society, but from a self-imposed existence at
 the periphery that a minority of "intellectuals" accept. "The most alienat-
 ed are primarily concentrated in the functionally most marginal roles."
 (21) Thus Shils' definition allows him to prove that intellectuals are hon-
 ored and influential within the status quo, and that peripheral disaffection
 is just that-a function of sociological marginality. The conclusion easily
 follows: intellectuals who reject the status quo are driven by social frustra-
 tion not by critical judgment. Society can, therefore, safely dismiss the ob-
 jections they raise.
 Shils' amorphous, functional definition further allows him to drain the
 term "intellectual" of its traditional connotations and moral significance:
 problems of quality and substance disappear. The definition quietly shifts
 the basis of judging intellectual work from an evaluation of quality and
 substance to the function of institutional support. Such a functional defini-
 tion is not "objective," it is merely misleading. It abandons explicit criteria
 of intellectual excellence for implicit ones. And the implicit ones are not in
 fact intellectual at all, but social. An "intellectual" is good, or as Shils would
 more "objectively" say, "responsible," when his "products" serve the cause
 of stability and the status quo. Ironically, Shils seems to share one of the
 basic assumptions of the Communist Party which he attacks. The proper
 role of the intellectual, both believe, is to serve a specific and established
 political structure. Indeed, Shils' definition seems almost identical with the
 official Soviet position which defines intellectuals as "a social stratum con-
 sisting of people who are occupied professionally with mental labor." The
 Soviet definition has abandoned any connotations of "critical" thought,
 Martin Malia has written, and instead it refers descriptively to "the tech-
 nological, liberal-professional, managerial, administrative, or merely white-
 collar personnel of the state." (22)
 Finally, and most centrally, is Shils' concept of "ideology," the Satanic
 term of his moral universe. Ideologies, he explains, are "comprehensive pat-
 terns of belief" that are rigid, closed, authoritative, intensely compelling,
 theoretically explicit, and morally absolutistic. "Ideology seeks to sacralize
 existence by bringing every part of it under the dominion of the ultimate-
 ly right principles." (23) Hence, ideologies lead to irreconcilable strife,
 turmoil, fanaticism, dogmatism, and all sorts of other social evils. They in-
 evitably endanger stability and the status quo. "In reality, of course," Shils
 acknowledges, "the ideological quality never completely supplants all other
 qualities." (24) Though he recognizes that he is creating an abstract social
 typology, he justifies it on the basis of its analytical usefulness and empiri-
 cal importance. Its real function, however, like that of his other concepts, is
 to create a moral discourse which defines the status quo as good but which
 sounds scientific.
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 Empirically, Shils' concept of "ideology" distorts both the past and the
 present. Not only is the "ideological quality" not found in pure form in the
 real world, but such a focus serves to artificially constrain the understanding
 of social processes. To the extent that certain attitudes are "ideological" in
 the sense of his definition, they tend to be either politically peripheral or
 significant because they are intimately related to a variety of conflicts aris-
 ing from the structure of society. In the former case they are unimportant;
 in the latter they comprise only one element of a complex situation. To the
 extent that other attitudes are not "ideological" according to his definition,
 they tend to take on a quality of rationality and objectivity which is mislead-
 ing and often dangerously self-serving. The major distortion arising from
 his definition, then, is not that "ideologies" neither exist nor are impor-
 tant; it is, rather, that it narrows the word's meaning in such a way that
 many profoundly political orientations, such as Shils' own social science, be-
 come by definition nonideological and therefore scientifically "objective."
 Historically it is understandable why Shils and many of his colleagues came
 to view "ideological politics" as they do. The concept developed out of the
 naturalistic, pragmatic tradition of American social science. In 1910 the
 founders of American social science believed that "metaphysics" was the
 sworn enemy of objective "science" and therefore the root of social evil. The
 crises of the thirties forced them to transfer their concept of "metaphysics"
 into the language of politics. The result was "ideology," the metaphysics of
 politics, the new enemy of science and the new root of social evil. Ideology,
 like metaphysics, was absolutist, transcendental, divisive, and empirically
 inaccurate; science, conversely, was relativistic, objective, consensual, and
 empirically accurate. Such a schema was, however, clearly not itself "objec-
 tive." It was, rather, philosophical and profoundly value-laden. (25) As
 an explanatory hypothesis, it was so simplistic as to become mere caricature.
 To explain Stalinism, Nazism, and the activities of American intellectuals in
 the thirties as stemming primarily from such an "ideological quality" reduced
 history to a morality play. (26) The conviction that "ideology," so defined,
 represented the major challenge to both society and the life of the mind was
 itself a belief that could only grow powerful in a certain kind of historical
 period. The preoccupations that Shils and many members of his generation
 share ties them to the image of the "ideologists" they attack: both groups
 believe that "ideologies" can in fact, consciously and directly, change the
 world. While that possibility has stirred hope in some, it repels Shils and his
 colleagues To a large extent, however, both groups start from the same
 intellectual assumptions.
 In spite of its analytically dubious and historically partisan meaning, how-
 ever, Shils' concept of "ideology" is useful to him because of its moral func-
 tion. First, it denigrates any fundamental criticism of the status quo as both
 irrational and dangerous. Second, it establishes from another direction the
 conclusion that the existent social structure marks out the limits of ration-
 al analysis. Third, as with his use of the concept "intellectual," it shifts the
 basis of moral judgment from questions of substantive criticism to the func-
 tion of social preservation.
 Perhaps of greatest importance, the concept of "ideology" establishes the
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 nature and value of its alleged intellectual and moral opposite. The vari-
 ous sciences, including the social sciences, "have not been ideological," Shils
 insists. "Indeed, they have had a solvent effect on ideologies and in a sense
 are anti-ideological." (27) Since the characteristics of "science" are obvi-
 ously contrary to those of "ideology," it follows that "science" must be open,
 empirical, objective, and universally verifiable. Since the characteristic atti-
 tudes of science can be applied to the study of societies, it also follows that
 there is an objective social science. Since Shils claims those characteristics
 as his own, it follows, finally, that his perspective represents an "objective"
 analysis of politics. Science, which is always proving things in modern society,
 thus comes ultimately to prove that the status quo indeed represents the true
 and the good.
 Shils specifically rejects the increasingly accepted contention that science
 itself is "ideological," and his argument is most revealing. In spite of the
 many statements that he adduces as "reasons" supporting his rejection, his
 argument revolves essentially around definitions. As he acknowledges at one
 point, science is not ideological "in the sense in which ideology has been
 defined and used in the foregoing analysis." (28) Indeed, given his defini-
 tion, he is correct. Recognizing the narrowness and moral implications of his
 definition, as well as the tautologous nature of his argument, it is clear that
 he proves nothing about the social functions and value assumptions that
 in fact characterize the very complicated phenomena we casually refer to
 as "science."
 One of the most significant intellectual developments of the last fifteen
 years has been the maturation of a sophisticated and provocative critique
 of the idea of "objective science". Whatever one thinks of the work of such
 individuals as Michael Polanyi, Thomas Kuhn, Noam Chomsky, Herbert
 Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, Alvin Gouldner, Robert Friedrichs, R. D. Laing,
 and many others, it is surely indefensible to dismiss their varied arguments by
 merely defining out of existence the problems they raise. Professor Shils has
 the learning and intellect to meet such approaches, and analyze them fair-
 ly and fully. That would be a major contribution to contemporary social
 thought, one that would shed light on the role of intellectuals, the function
 of science, and the nature of human reason. Hopefully he will accept the
 challenge in his forthcoming works and help advance our general under-
 standing of real problems. His moral schema serves only to deflect his own
 considerable intellectual powers and to distort our understanding of both
 past and present.
 The careers of Slichter, Leith, and Russell illustrate the rise of the prac-
 tical, institutionalized "service intellectual". Critics might dismiss them as
 mere technicians or even as "servants of power". Such a "new left" evalua-
 tion, however, surely lacks subtlety as much as does the more traditional view
 which would picture them as heralding a new age of objectivity, benevolence,
 and progress. We are indebted to scholars such as Shils for pointing out many
 of the complexities involved in studying the role and significance of such
 individuals. Yet hopefully we are beyond the polemics that inform his analy-
 sis. Evaluating the career and role of the "service intellectual" involves at
 some point inescapable moral judgments. By making such judgnlents openly
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 and by setting out the criteria fully, scholars can deal more adequately with
 the problem of the "proper role" of the intellectual and at the same time
 perhaps place their historical analyses on whatever reasonably "objective"'
 basis it is possible for human reason to attain.
 Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
 University of Missouri-Columbia
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